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COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
to the agency by Congress.7 The statutory founda-
tion of Circular 230 is 31 U.S.C. section 330. The first 
portion of the statute has been of principal signifi-
cance in the litigation to date. It allows Treasury to 
"regulate the practice of representatives of persons 
before" Treasury and to require, as a condition 
"before admitting a representative to practice," that 
the representative demonstrate "(A) good character; 
(B) good reputation; (C) necessary qualifications to 
enable the representative to provide persons valu-
able service; and (D) competence to advise and 
assist persons in presenting their cases."8 
The original version of what is now 31 U.S.C. 
section 330 was enacted in 1884.9 The need for the 
1884 legislation arose from the Civil War and west-
ward expansion, which engendered "claims for 
damages, pensions, bonuses, back pay, etc .... [A] 
swarm of individuals, recognizing no ethical re-
straints, solicited representation of claimants and 
engaged in the buying and selli.ng of the claimants' 
rights. [This] reached the proportions of a national 
scandal," necessitating granting authority to de-
partments to regulate the representation. 10 
31 U.S.C. section 330(a) largely took its current 
form in 1982. Wording changes made in 1982 were 
stylistic; Congress intended to make no substantive 
change in the provision.11 The statute also consists 
of subsection (b) (setting out the sanctions Treasury 
may impose for violation of the prescribed rules), 
subsection (c) (providing rules particular to ethical 
violations by appraisers permitted to practice be-
fore the IRS), and subsection (d) (addressing written 
advice rendered on potentially abusive transac-
tions). Subsection (d) is discussed in Section V.B.2 
below. 
II. Loving 
Although 31 U.S.C. section 330(a) has changed 
little since its enactment in 1884, relevant IRS poli-
cies and the importance of return preparers have 
both changed.12 Then, the federal income tax, estate 
tax, and gift tax had not yet been enacted, so return 
preparers did not exist as tesserae in the mosaic of 
American society. Now, "paid return preparers file 
about 90 million individual income tax returns each 
year, or 60 percent of all individual [income tax] 
75Pt>, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2013); 
and Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986) ("an agency's power 
is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress"). 
831 U.S.C. section 330(a)(1) and (2). 
9Act of July 7, 1884, ch. 334. 
10George Maurice Morris, "Growth and Regulation of the 
Treasury Bar," 8 ABA J. 742 (1922). 
11 H.R. Rep. No. 97-651, at 19 (1982); see also Poole v. United 
States, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15351, at •5 (D.D.C. 1984). 
12See Gibbs, st1pra note 6, at 336, n.39. 
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returns filed."13 The IRS believes that as a result of 
incompetence and fraud, returns prepared by un-
eruolled preparers are especially likely to be mate-
rially incorrect. '4 
In 2011 Treasury promulgated regulations to im-
pose various obligations on previously largely un-
regulated tax return preparers, including testing 
and continuing education requirements.15 The Lov-
ing plaintiffs were among these newly regulated 
xeturn preparers. They brought suit under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA)16 and the De-
claratory Judgment Act,17 seeking invalidation of 
the testing and continuing education requirements 
and related fees.18 The district and circuit courts 
held for the plaintiffs. They concluded that the 
regulations were beyond the scope of the authority 
conferred on Treasury by 31 U.S.C. section 330(a) 
and thus were invalid under Chevron step one.19 
The circuit court set forth six rationales, of which 
two are principally significant for our discussion.20 
First, the circuit court concluded that tax return 
13Preston Benoit, deputy director of the IRS Return Preparer 
Office, quoted by Matthew R. Madara, "rRS Officials Request 
Authority to Regulate Preparers," Tax Notes, Aug. 25, 2014, p. 
921 (adding that paid tax return preparers have a "significant 
im~act on tax administration"). 
4See, e.g., Allison Bennett, "]RS Study Finds High ElTC 
Overclaims by Unenrolled Tax Return Preparers," 33 Tax Man. 
Weekly Rep. 1184 (2014) (reporting that earned income tax credits 
were overclaimed in 33 to 40 percent of returns prepared by 
unenrolled preparers, compared with 11 to 13 percent of returns 
prepared by volunteers in IRS-sponsored programs; adding, 
however, "it would take further research to determine whether 
these dollar overclaim percentages were due to the behavior 
and abil ity of preparers, or differences in the characteristics of 
tax~ayers seeking assistance"). 
531 C.F.R. sections 10.3(f), 10.4(d), 10.5, 10.6(d)(2), 10.6(e)(2), 
and 10.6(f). 
165 U.S.C. section 706(2). 
1728 U.S.C. sections 2201 and 2202. 
18The plaintiffs did not challenge, and the court did not 
invalidate, the rei,rulations' requirement that preparers obtain 
preparer tax identification numbers. Lovi11g, 920 F. Supp.2d 108, 
109 (D.D.C. 2013). 
19£.g., Loving, 742 F.3d at 1022 ("Put in conventiona l Chevron 
parlance, the lRS's interpretation fails at Chevron step 1 because 
it is foreclosed by the statute. Tn any event, the fRS's interpre-
tation would also fail at Chevron step 2 because it is unreason-
able in light of the statute's text, history, s tructure, and 
context.' '); see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, 467 
U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
2
°The other four, partly interrelated rationales were: "the 
history of section 330" (it did not originally target tax return 
preparers), " the broader statutory framework" (the many tar-
geted provisions in the code, which would have been unneces-
sary if 31 U.S.C. section 330 is as expansive as claimed by the 
IRS), "the nature and scope of the authority being claimed by 
the IRS" (inadequate legislative support for "vast expansion of 
the IRS's authority"), and "the IRS's past approach to this 
statute" (the uneasy relationship of the IRS's current position to 
its century and a half of inactivity under the statute). Loving, 742 
F.3d at 1019-1021 . 
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challenged provisions based again on Chevron step 
one analysis. The cour t followed the Loving ap-
proach, including the representatives and practice 
rationales: The preparer merely assists the taxpayer 
and lacks the legal authority to act on the taxpayer's 
behalf, so he is not a representative;"1 and there is 
no extant controversy before commencement of the 
lRS audit or administrative appeal, so assisting on 
the claims does not involve practice before the 
IRS.32 
The Ridgely court rejected the government's 
counterarguments. For instance, the government 
argued that in addition to authority granted by the 
statute, agencies have inherent authority to regulate 
practice before them. The Ridgely court, as had the 
court in Loving, rejected this on the ground that a 
specific statutory delegation displaces any inherent 
authority.33 
The government also argued that preparers 
sometimes engage in activities apart from making 
ordinary refund claims - services properly subject 
to Treasury regulation even under the Loving con-
ception, bringing them within the ambit of Circular 
230. This view appears to reflect government policy 
rather than an ad hoc litigation position. The direc-
tor of the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility 
has been quoted as saying, "After a practitioner 
submits a Form 2848 'Power of Attorney and Dec-
laration of Representative,' granting them [sic] 
power of attorney, [OPR] will treat the practitioner 
as covered by Circular 230."34 Nonetheless, the 
Ridgely court gave short shrift to this "within Cir-
cular 230 in any respect means within Circular 230 
in a ll respects" contention.35 
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986). 
However, this usual s tandard is modified when a court 
reviews an admi.nis trative decision under the APA. ln an APA 
case, the role of the trial court is to ascertain whether "as a 
matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permit-
ted the agency to make the decision it did." Thus, summary 
judgment in an APA case is used to determine whether, as a 
matter of law, "the agency action is supported by the adminis-
trative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard 
of review." Sierra Clu/1 v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp.2d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 
2006) (citations omitted); see also Richards v. INS, 554 F2d 1173, 
1177, and n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
31 Ridgely, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXJS 96447, at •1s. 
32/d. at •16. 
"-
11d. at •22; see also Loving, 742 F.3d a t 1014-1016. See generally 
Johnson, "When General Statutes and Specific Statutes Con-
flict," State Tax Notes, July 12, 2010, p. 113. 
3'1Karen Hawkins as quoted by Will iam R. Davis, "OPR Will 
Tell Practitioners to Remove Circular 230 Disclaimers," Tax 
Note.s, June 23, 2014, p. 1360. 
35See Ridgely, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96447, at •22. 
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B. Other Cases 
1. Forerunners. Although the Loving opinions 
reached the right result, their outcome was striking 
for at least two reasons. First, the government had 
stressed the practical importance of the invalidated 
2011 regulations,36 and it is no light matter for "the 
least dangerous branch"37 to invalidate what the 
political branches believe to be an initiative of great 
public policy significance.38 The Loving courts tran-
scended this reluctance by stressing that in law, the 
end does not always justify the means,39 and, .in an 
act of rhetorical jujitsu, by invoking the interpreta-
tional principle that the higher the practical stakes 
of the issue, the clearer must be the evidence that 
Congress intended to delegate resolution of the 
issue to an agency rather than reserving that reso-
lution for itself.40 
The second reason the Loving result is s triking is 
more germane for present purposes. Litigation be-
fore Lovinf? had given little hint that substantial 
aspects of Circular 230 might be at risk of invalida-
tion. For example, the D.C. district court's 1984 
Poole decision rejected a challenge to the validity of 
Circular 230 section 10.50, which defines disrepu-
table conduct - one of the bases for disbarment or 
other sanctions under Circu lar 230 section 10.51.41 
The plaintiff was a CPA who had been disbarred 
from practicing before the IRS because of his willful 
failure to file his own income tax returns for three 
consecutive years . 
The CPA argued that Treasury's regulatory au-
thority under Circular 230 is limited to those who 
36See Johnson, supra note 5, at 520-524. 
37See Alexander Hamilton, Tlte Federalist, No. 781 at 4 (Clinton 
Rossiter, ed. 1961). 
38As was illustrated by the gymnastics Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr. performed to avoid invalidating the A {fordable Care 
Act. See National Federat ion of Independent Business v. Sebelius 
(NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593-2600 (2012) (concluding that the 
shared responsibility payment js no t a tax for sta tutory pur-
poses but is a tax for constitutional purposes). 
:wLoving, 742 F.3d at 1022. Quoting two tax cases, the 
Supreme Court recently observed: "But in the last analysis, 
these a lways-fascinating policy discussions are beside the point. 
The role of this Court is to apply the s tatute as it is wri tten -
even if we think some other approach might accor[dj with good 
policy." Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2014) 
(punctuation omitted) (quoting Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 
235, 252 (1996), quoting Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 
398 (1984)). 
40Loving, 742 F.3d at 1021 ("courts should not lightly presume 
congressional intent to implicitly delegate decisions of major 
economic or political s ignificance to agencies"); see also Utility 
Air Regulatory Group v. E.PA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014), and 
FDA v. Brown & Willia111so11 Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 
(2000). 
41 Poole, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15351. 
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represent claimants before Treasury. The court dis-
agreed, finding that the agency's "disciplinary au-
thority clearly extends to all practitioners before the 
Treasury Department."42 The Poole court, however, 
did not attempt to definitively resolve the ques-
tions, key to Loving and Ridgely, of precisely what 
constitutes practice and who are representatives for 
purposes of 31 U.S.C. section 330(a). 
The spirit of Poole seemed congenial to generous 
construction of 31 U.S.C. section 330(a),43 but there 
is nothing definitive in the case for our issues, and 
there are several distinguishing features.44 Poole was 
not cited in any of the Loving or Ridgely opinions.45 
For the above reasons, this omission is readily 
w1derstandable. 
Another pre-Loving case is Wright v. Everson, 
decided in 2008.46 Under section 10.7(c)(l) of Circu-
lar 230, unenrolled tax return preparers may repre-
sent taxpayers before the IRS in only limited 
circumstances. The plaintiff, an unenroJled pre-
parer, challenged this restriction. The court found 
that there were valid reasons for distinguishing 
among types of advisers and thus that Circular 230 
section 10.7(c)(l) was not arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute. In Wright, the 
plaintiff sought to expand the scope of regulated 
representation, not to contract it as in Loving. Ac-
cordingly, Wright, too, is of limited utility in this 
context. 
Some recent cases have mentioned Loving in not 
especially helpful contexts.47 In other cases, parties 
have distorted Loving in futile efforts to deflect tax 
enforcement directed against them.48 More interest-
421d. at •2. 
4
"fhe Poole court remarked that courts "must uphold the 
agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute it administers" 
and even invoked the inherent authority notion rejected by 
Loving. Id. at *5. 
440ver a half century of consistent judicial and administra-
tive interpretation supported the government's position in 
Poole. Id. ln contrast, the regulations at issue in Loving were 
promulgated in 2011, over a century and a half after original 
enactment of the statutory authori ty. Moreover, before 2011, IRS 
officials sometimes publicly denied that they had the authority 
under the statute to enact rules such as those in the 20ll 
regulations. See Loving, 742 F.3d at 1021. 
'
15Lndeed, Poole has been cited in only one judicial decision -
a tort case, Sicig11ano v. United Stales, 127 F. Supp.2d 325, 331 (D. 
Conn. 2001). 
46543 F.3d 649 (11th Cir. 2008). 
4 7E.g., Marlin v. /TH Tax Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15512, at 
*24, n.6 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 2013) (noting the possible relevance of 
Loving to subsidiary questions on class certification in a tort 
case~. 
4 E.g., United States v. Elsass, 978 F. Supp.2d 901, 911-912 (S.D. 
Ohio 2013) {rejecting the defendants' attempt to use Loving to 
wriggle out of a permanent injunction against their egregious 
misbehavior as return preparers); and United States v. 1'0111/inson, 
No. 12-10051-01 (D. Kan. 2013) (mentioning Loving in rejecting 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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ing are cases involving challenges to fees charged to 
practitioners by the IRS. Return preparers are 
charged user fees by the IRS for obtaining and 
renewing preparer tax identification numbers. ln 
the 2012 case of Brannen v. United States, the Elcv-
enfh Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to 
fees for initially obtaining PTINs.49 The following 
year, a district court in the Eleventh Circuit rejected 
a statutory challenge and held that the renewal fees 
are not arbitrary and capricious in either design or 
amount.511 
Although the plaintiff in that case, Buckley v. 
United States, urged the court to look to Loving for 
guidance, the court was not moved. PTINs are 
required by statutes other than 31 U.S.C. section 
330.s1 Similarly, although user fees are mentioned in 
Circular 230,52 there is statutory authorization for 
them outside 31 U.S.C. section 330.53 Because the 
PTIN scheme and the testing/ continuing education 
scheme rested on different statutory authority, the 
Bucklet; court found that Loving had no applicability 
to the case.54 Litigation on this score continues. 
Section III.C.2 describes a pending suit regarding 
PTIN fees. 
2. AICPA. Section IV explores how the government 
may react to Loving, Ridgely, and possible future 
decisions of similar ilk. One approach is to substi-
tute the carrot for the stick - that is, to attempt to 
achieve the same ends through voluntary rather 
than mandatory means. Arguably, that is how the 
IRS has responded to Loving. 
Although, as described in Section IV, the govern-
ment is urging Congress to legislatively reverse 
Loving, the IRS created an ostensibly voluntary 
the argument of the defendant in a criminal tax case that only 
those subject to regulation under Circular 230 can be subject to 
criminal prosecution under section 7206(2) for aiding and 
assisting in preparing and filing fa lse and fraudulent returns). 
49Brannen v. United States, 682 F.3d 13J6 (11th Cir. 2012), affg 
No. 4:11-CV-0135 (N.D. Ga. 2011). 
508uckley v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184758 (N.D. 
Ca. 2013). 
51
" Any return or claim for refund prepared by a tax return 
preparer shall bear such identifying number" as Treasury will 
prescribe. Section 6109(a)(4); see section 6695(c) (penalty for 
failure to comply with section 6109(a)(4)), section 6696(e) (de-
fining return and claim for refund), and section 770l(a)(36) 
(with stated exceptions, defining a tax return preparer as "any 
person who prepares for compensation ... any return . . . or 
claim for rehmd" or who so prepares "a substantia l portion of a 
return or claim for refund"). 
52See 31 C.F.R. section l0.6(d)(6). 
s.'See 31 C.F.R. section 9701 {authorizing agencies to charge 
user fees and setting out criteria for determining their amount). 
54 Bucklet;, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184758, at *7; see also Loving, 
920 F. Supp.2d at 109 (clarifying that the Loving holding does not 
extend to the PTIN scheme "except that the IRS may no longer 
condition PTIN availability on being 'authorized to practice' 
under 31 U.S.C. section 330"). 
225 
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annual filing season program (AFSP). While the 
AFSP was being developed, both the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the 
National Association of Enrolled Agents expressed 
to the IRS their doubts about the wisdom and 
legality of the initiative.55 Undeterred, the IRS es-
tablished the AFSP in June 2014.56 
The AFSP targets return preparers who are not 
already enrolled agents57 - the same target popu-
lation as the regulations invalidated in Loving. Un-
der the AFSP, preparers will receive benefits if they 
do voluntarily what the invalidated regulations 
would have compelled them to do: pass an IRS-
devised examination and satisfy specified continu-
ing education requirements.58 The benefits from 
taking these steps are an IRS-issued record of 
completion, inclusion of the preparer in a preparer 
database publicly accessible through the IRS's web-
site, and a limited ability to represent taxpayers 
before the IRS regarding returns they prepare.s9 
On July 15, 2014, the AICPA filed suit in (can you 
guess? that's right) the D.C. district court for de-
claratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the 
AFSP. The suit alleged that (1) the CRS lacks statu-
tory authority to create such a program; (2) the 
AFSP was promulgated in violation of the notice 
and comment rules of the APA;60 and (3) the AFSP 
is arbitrary and capricious under the APA61 because 
it will confuse consumers and will not effectively 
address policy issues concerning unethical return 
preparers. The AICPA maintained that the AFSP is 
an impermissible attempt to make an end run 
around Loving: Because it would create strong com-
petitive pressures to comply, the nominally volun-
tary program is de facto mandatory.62 
Concluding that the AlCPA lacked standing, the 
district court granted the government's motion to 
dismiss the suit.63 None of the AICPA's members 
55See, e.g., David van den Berg, "EnrC>lled Agents Ask IRS to 
Scrap Return Preparer Proposal," Tax Notes, June 2, 2014, p. 
1017. 
fi<> FS-2014-8; lR-2014-75. 
57Enrolled agents are persons who are not attorneys or CPAs 
but who have passed a competence test administered by or for 
the IRS. Enrolled agents were subject to Circular 230 even before 
promulgation of the 2011 regulations that were invalidated in 
Lovinx. Sl'f 31 C.F.R. sections 10.3 through 10.6. 
r.ssee A/CPA v. IR S, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXJS 157723, at *6 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 27, 2014) ("The criteria for participation [in the AFSPJ are 
strikingly similar tC> the requirements of the 2011 Rule"). 
59See Rev. Proc. 2014-42, 2014-29 !RB 192. 
605 U.S.C. section 553. 
''
15 U.S.C. section 706(2)(A). 
62See William Hoffman, "AlCPA Files Suit to Stop IRS 
Pre£arer Certification Program," Tax Notes, July 21, 2014, p. 240. 
3Although the district court did not reach the merits, the 
government might have won if it had. The same judge decided 
Lovi11x and A/CPA. In Loving, the judge had s ugges ted in dictum 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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are uneruolled return preparers. The AICPA con-
tended that although the AFSP does not hurt the 
organization, it does hurt its members, which thus 
allows the AICPA to sue under the doctrine of 
representational or associational standing. This con-
tention failed because the court found the members' 
alleged injury in fact to be conclusory, speculative, 
and not fairly traceable to the AFSP.64 
That may not be the end of the story. The AICPA 
may appeal. If it doesn't, it (or another organiza-
tion) likely could find someone who does have 
sufficient connection and who would be willing to 
join as a plaintiff in a new suit. Since the same wine 
may be poured out of different bottles in future 
litigation, I analyze below the merits of the AICPA's 
contentions. 
The AICPA's suit implicated a significant but 
somewhat murky vein of administrative law. Gen-
erally, the APA requires agencies to publish pro-
posed rules in the Federal Register, to give interested 
persons the opportunity to comment on the pro-
posed rules, and to consider comments seriously in 
promulgating final rules. Agency "interpretative 
rules, general statements of policy, [and] rules of 
agency organization, procedure, or practice" are 
excepted from these requirements.65 
Courts have wrestled with the contours of this 
exception, but generally speaking, rules that create 
binding obligations are outside it.66 Nonetheless, 
scholars and courts have recognized the reality that 
even formally nonbinding agency pronouncements 
can, as a practical matter, have powerful, sometimes 
coercive, effects on regulated persons.67 
No bright-line rule exists. On one hand, "Con-
gress did not intend that the APA definition of a rule 
be construed so broadly that every agency action 
would be subject to judicial review. "68 On the other 
hand, at some point, an agency's nominally volun-
tary program can be a binding rule.69 In making this 
that the IRS try a voluntary program, a fact the judge noted in 
A/CPA. See A/CPA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157723, at "2; and 
Loving, 920 F. Supp.2d at 111. 
61AICPA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157723, at •18-*20. 
C>S5 U.S.C. sectiC>n 553(b)(3)(A). 
66See, e.g., Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 315 (1979); Ameriam 
Mining Corp. & Nat'/ Ind. Sand Ass'n v. Mine Safety & Healtlt 
Admin.1 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
67£.g., Mark Seidenfeld, "Substituting Substantive for Proce-
dural Review of Guidance Documents," 90 Tex. L. Rev. 331, 343 
(2011); cf NrTB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602, and Steward Machine Co. v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) (both recognizing that at some 
point, pressure can become so intense that it turns into compul-
sion). 
68/ndustrial Safety Equip. Ass'n Inc. v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1120 
(D.C. Cir. 1988). 
69 E.g., Sugar Cane Growers Co-op of Florida v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 
89, 96 and n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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substance-over-form evaluation, courts have ad-
verted, wiUl varying degrees of favor, to factors 
such as wheth<>r the allt>ged compulsion is direct or 
indirect, how substantial Lhc impact is on the regu-
lated person o r group, and whether the agency 
acted with an improper purpoS<.' or from an errone-
ous factual foundtllion .711 
Of particular inlcrt• ' t in the A/CPA context, the 
substance-over-form <ln<ilysis C<ln include (although 
not necessarily as dt.'Cisivc considcralions) whether 
the agency "put.<> a s tamp of approvaJ or disap-
provaJ on a given type of bc.•havior"71 and whether 
the agency h<ls an "intent of penalizing a party 
through adverse publicity."12 Given the circum-
stances of it~ dcvclopmcnl, these considerations 
may be pertinent lo the AFS P. 
Given the statc of tht• law, one can hardly assert 
with confidcnce a vit'W on whether the AJCPA's "in 
substance mandatory" argument wouJd succeed. 
My conjecture flt this stage is that it would be hard 
for a plaintiff with standing to establish lhat the 
AFSP crosses th<• Uucshold into d<' facto mandatory, 
but that factual development, advocacy skill, and 
judicial inclination a ll would have roles to play in 
the determination. 
l harbor ~rious doubts about the AJCPA's arbi-
trary and capriciou~ contention. It is illegitimate for 
courts - under U1c guise f>f judicial review - to 
substitute their own policy judgments and prefer-
ences for those of ag1mcics with specialized exper-
tise on lhe subjc'Cl mattcr.71 Accordingly, courts 
conducting an arbitrary and capricious reviews are 
deferential to agencies' balancing of competing 
consideralions.74 I doubt that complaints like the 
70£.X·· lmfristrwl Snfl'ly l~q11iJ1.1 837 F.2d at 1120-1121; and 
Americ1111 llos11. A,s·11 v. /louw11, &14 P.2d 1037, 1046-1048 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
11 Amerirnn llos11. Ass'11, H..14 F.2d at 1047. 
1'2 fnd11stri11/ Snfl•ttt I.quip., 837 fi.2d nt 1119. 
7.1£.g., M1ssmtr1 v. /t•11k111s, 515 U.S. 70, 131-133 (1995) 
(ThomaJ>, J., concumn>;); Ciliu11s to flreseTVl' ODl!rton Park v. 
Volpe, -IOI U.S. -102, 415-416 ( IY71); f'ltdfJS Dodgt• Corp. v. NLRB, 
313 U.S. 177, 19-l (19-11); and Richard J. Pierre Jr., "The Role of 
Constitutional and Pohtkal 11,corv m Admini!.lrative Law," 64 
Tex. L Rro. 46Y, c;(}.l-l\07 ( 19R"i) 
7 
.. E.g., rlorula 8"11k1·,.., i\ .. ,·11 u. Dq1art111mt of Treasury, 2014 
lJ.S. Dht. LE>.IS 3521, ill • 1-1 (D l>.C. )iln n, 2014) Judge Jame:;. 
E. aoa .. ~rg Wn.lll• bl1th th(' I [11rult1 B.111k1•rs and uwmg opinions 
for the D.C di .. trict court. 
An agency "i" a11thor1/Lod tu maM- a r.llional legislath·tHype 
judgment If lhl.' [rult·I ~ll-.:tt.J by tlw agency reflects its 
infomwd d1..cretmn, .ind •~ ne1thl'r pall'ntly unreasonable nor a 
dictate of unbndll-d whim, lhl'll the agency's decision ad-
equately ~h.,fil'l> lhl· l.irbitrnrv and capricious! standard of 
review.'' W/G Trlr11l1t111c• Co t•. fCC, 675 F.2d JM6, 388-389 tD.C. 
Cir. 1982) (cit<Jtiuru. .md punctu.-ition marks omitted); see al.."'1 
Assocml<•d B11i/1/itrs & CMtrntltlrs f11r t>. <;/ii11, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 371116, ill •47 .. •48 (0.D.C. Mnr. 21, 2014) (rejecting an 
arbitrary and c11pricio11-; ch«llenf<\I.' anti staling, "Plaintiff may 
ffootnotr continued in next column.) 
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AICPA's r<'garding customer confusion and the 
failure to solve a ll problems would suffice to over-
come this deference. 
Tf the foregoing "fX'Culations prove accurate, the 
hope of the plaintiff with standing would hang on 
the argument that th<' IRS hr'ld no statutory author-
ity to crc.•atc the AFSP. Th<'lt is, of course, where 
Lul.ling and Ridgl'ly come.• in. However, assuming the 
court condudt>s that lhc AFSP is indeed voluntary, 
there may be a difference between the nonbinding 
agency action in l\ICP/\ tlnd th<' binding agency 
actions in uming and Ritfgl'ly. ls thC' no-statutory-
basis argument JS strong in thC' former context as in 
the latter? 
[f prior Supreme Court pronouncements are 
taken literally, ag~mcy actions of every sort must be 
traceable to a congressional conferral of power.75 
However, al IN1s l two rejoinders might be available 
to the lRS in .rn /\TCP/\-likc su it. First, a generous 
construction of one of the s tatutory provisions 
might cover th<> AFSr. For instance, Congress has 
delegated to Lh<.' Trc•asury secretary the administra-
tion and enf o rcemf.'nt of the lntemaJ Revenue 
Code7" and hai:: allowed th<' secretary to subdeJ-
egate to the IRS commissioner "c;uch duties and 
powers as the Secretary may prescribe, including 
the power to ... administer, manage, conduct, di-
rect, and c;upervisc the l'xccution of the internal 
revenue law<;."77 A mandatory registration program 
might fall oulc;idt' lhc ambit of lhis provision, but a 
voluntary incl'ntivc program might fall within it. 
Second, perhaps inhcl'C'nt agency authority - a 
concept rcjcctt-d in Lovi11g and Ridgely78 but recog-
nized i_n Poo/e7'1 - would cover a voluntary pro-
gram. Lm1i11g and Hidgcly rejected the government's 
"inherent t\gcmcy outhority" argument on the 
ground thal 31 U.S.C. section 330, a specific statu-
tory provis ion, controls over general inherent 
power. But 31 U.S.C. section 330 Clpplies to regulat-
ing reprcscnta livcs appearing before Treasury and 
to admitting them lt) pr<lctice.1(11 1f the AFSP is held 
well be oom...oct Lhat mor(' targetl>J data and modified calcula-
tion::. Wlmld le.id tu <> more prt.ic1se ulllil.llion goal, but perfect 
prec1::.ion 1::. not what the Admim::.trative Pmcedure Act de-
mands"). 
7'ir.g I WUNU/Ul flub ~1·rv Cu111111 II t~ rec. 476 U.S. 355, 374 
(1986) ("an agency lill•rally ha., no pmvcr to act ... unless and 
until c,1ngn.":>l> cunfor.. pmwr upon 1t"). 
"''Section 7801(il)(I). 
77Sechon 7t103{a)(2)(A) 
78wvm;.:, 742 F.3d ill 1014-1016; Rtdgt>ly, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
96447, at •22. !'t'(' ~1111ro lext <iccomp<inyin); note 24. 
Npooft•, 1984 U.S D1'>I Ll.Xl5 15151 , at •.t-•s. Set> supra note 
43. 1 lowcwr, fl0{1/1• pl'l.'(t'<ft-d / .. 011is1111111 Public Service, which 
emphasized that agl•ncic., have no powers except those con-
ferred nn them by .. tntull!. Sc•1• s111ir11 note 7'i. 
lll1J1 U.S.C !>t'Clmn .\10(ri)(I), (2). 
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to be voluntary, it arguably would be outside the 
domain of 31 U.S.C. section 330. Then 31 U.S.C. 
section 330 would not displace inherent agency 
authority. Even if that were accepted, the govern-
ment would still have to define the contours of 
inherent agency authority and show that the AFSP 
is within them. Far from a slam dunk, this nonethe-
less is a potential government response to the 
no-authority argument. 
Could that response be buttressed by asserting a 
statutory basis for the alleged inherent powers? The 
so-called housekeeping statute applies to all federal 
agencies, including Treasury. It provides: "The head 
of an Executive department ... may prescribe regu-
lations for the government of his department, the 
conduct of its employees, and the custody, use, and 
preservation of its records, papers, and property."81 
The roots of the provision reach back to the found-
ing of the republic.82 
In the main, courts have read the statute as being 
narrow. The statute "seems to be simply a grant of 
authority to [an] agency to regulate its own af-
fairs,"83 and it confers only administrative, not 
legislative, power.84 This would not seem to move 
the IRS beyond what Loving and Ridgely already 
allow. That is, the housekeeping statute might allow 
the IRS to impose requirements on practitioners 
directly interacting with the IRS but would seem 
not to extend to activities preceding an IRS audit or 
other agency-taxpayer interactive processes. 
However, the outer boundaries of the statute 
have never been precisely defined. Perhaps it's the 
nature of the beast that only case-by-case decision-
making is possible. And the courts' generally re-
strained view of the statute does not stop agencies 
from trying to make rules. Agencies in need of 
statutory authority have asserted the housekeeping 
statute as the basis for many regulatory initiatives. 
Creative and aggressive agency assertions of au-
thority under the statute have usually been rejected 
by the courts - but not always.ss 
Finally, to complicate matters further, there is 
another potential strand of analysis. Above, we 
considered whether the AFSP is a rule for APA 
purposes. But the APA also addresses other types of 
agency actions, one of whkh is an agency's impo-
~ 15 U.S.C. section 301. 
i;
2 1t was enacted in 1789 "to help General Washington get his 
administration underway by speUing out the authority for 
executive officials to set up offices and file Government docu-
ments." H.R. Rep. No. 85-1461, at 1 (1958). 
83CJ1rysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 (1979). 
ll4United States v. George, 228 U.S. 14, 22 (1913). 
85Sce United States ex rel. O'Keefe v. McD011nell Douglas Corp., 
132 F.3d 1252, 1254-1256 (8th Cir. 1998) (reviewing cases, includ-
ing a few agency victories). 
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sition of sanctions. The APA provides that a ''sanc-
tion may not be imposed ... except within 
jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as autho-
rized by law,"86 and it allows courts to "hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action ... in excess 
of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations."87 
If a return preparer does not voluntarily satisfy 
the requirements of the AFSP, the IRS will with.hold 
from her a certificate of completion, recognition on 
the IRS website, and representation privileges. 
Could those consequences be considered sanctions? 
The APA defines sanction broadly, to encompass 
deprivation of freedom, imposition of a fine, seizure 
of property, denial of a license, or "taking other 
compulsory or restrictive action."SS Under some 
circumstances, adverse publicity can constitute a 
sanction.89 The AICPA's complaint did not raise the 
AFSP-as-sanction argument, but that issue may 
develop later. 
3. Pending cases. Two other challenges to Circular 
230 provisions have garnered attention.90 The plain-
tiff in Sexton v. Hawkins91 is a former lawyer who 
was disbarred by his state after he pleaded guilty to 
mail fraud and money laundering. He still has a 
valid PTIN. OPR has suspended him from practice 
before the IRS and is pursuing an ongoing investi-
gation of him. Incident to the investigation, OPR 
sought to compel hjm to disclose documents and 
answer interrogatories, with the prospect of sanc-
tions under Circular 230 should he fail to comply. 
He brought suit, seeking injwKtive relief against 
the ongoing investigation. Citing Loving, the plain-
tiff alleges that he is not a practitioner before the 
IRS, that mere possession of a PTIN does not make 
him one, and that he is therefore not subject to 
regulatory supervision under Circular 230. 
The government counters that Loving is not ger-
mane. OPR is investigating the plaintiff not merely 
as a return preparer but because of allegations that 
he offered to give written tax advice despite being 
suspended from practice before the IRS. In August 
2013 the government filed a motion to dismiss. fr1 
October 2014 the court denied that motion. The 
case, presumably, will proceed to trial. During the 
pendency of the case, the plaintiffs need not pro-
duce information requested by the IRS, and the 
865 U.S.C. section 558(a). 
875 U.S.C. section 706(2)(c). 
885 U.S.C. section 551 (10). 
89Sec, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 602 F.2d 401, 408 
(D.C. Cir. 1979); and H. Rep. No. 7-1980 (1946) (House report on 
the APA). 
90See Jaime Arora, "2 Cases to Watch in the Wake of Loving," 
Tax Notes, Sept. 1, 2014, p . 1029. 
91 No.13-cv-00893 (D. Nev. 2014). 
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government may not curtail the plaintiffs' ability to 
electronically file returns for clients for failure to 
produce information. 
In Davis v. JRS,92 the plaintiff had pleaded guilty 
to aiding the preparation of a false tax return, 
leading to the loss of his CPA license, termination of 
his ability to practice before the IRS, and expulsion 
from participation in the IRS's e-file system. His 
CPA license and ability to practice before the IRS 
were later restored. His access to the e-file system 
was not, however. Because most retmn preparers 
are required to use e-filing, this omission essentially 
prevents him from preparing returns, effectively 
nullifying his reinstatement.93 In essence, the plain-
tiff is arguing that preparing returns is practicing 
before the IRS. That was the government's rejected 
position in Loving. 
The plaintiff filed suit, asking the court to direct 
the IRS to allow him to again participate in thee-file 
system. As of this writing, the case was in the 
discovery stage. If the case goes forward, it will be 
interesting to see whether and how the government 
controverts what had been its position in Loving. 
On September 8, 2014, the plaintiffs filed their 
complaint in Steele v. United States. As noted in 
Section II.B above, suits against PTIN fees failed in 
Brannen and Buckley, that is, in the Eleventh Circuit 
and one of its district courts. The plaintiffs filed 
Steele (unsurprisingly) in the D.C. district court to 
capitalize on Loving and Ridgely. 
Interestingly, Steele was brought as a class action 
on behalf of two named CPAs and, according to the 
caption of the complaint, "A Class of More Than 
700,000 Similarly Situated Individuals and Busi-
nesses."94 The class consists of: 
individuals who prepare tax returns for others 
for compensation and firms (including part-
nerships) and companies the employees or 
some or all of the owners of which prepare tax 
returns for others for compensation, and who: 
(a) paid the initial PTIN issuance user fee; or 
92No. 14-cv-0261 (N.D. Ohio 20J4). 
'.l:J.The IRS can censure, suspend, disbar, or impose monetary 
penalties against any practitioner who inter a/ia. is incompetent 
or disreputable. 31 C.F.R. section l0.50(a). Incompetence and 
disreputable conduct include "willJully failing to file on mag-
netic or other electronic media a tax return prepared by the 
practitioner when the practitioner is required to do so by the 
Federal tax laws unless the fai lure is due to reasonable cause 
a.nd not due to willful neglect." 31 C.P.R. section 10.51(a)(16). 
940r maybe more. Paragraph 106 of the complaint states: 
"The number of plaintiffs is believed to be between 700,000 and 
1,200,000." Steele v. United St11tes, No. 1 :cv-14-1523 (D.D.C. filed 
Sept. 8, 2014). 
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(b) paid the initial PTIN issuance user fee and 
one or more P'TIN renewal user fees.95 
The complaint alleges that both the fee paid to 
obtain a PTIN initially and fees paid for annual 
renewals of the PTIN are invalid or excessive. 
Recognizing that the statutory authority for impo-
sition of user fees is 31 U.S.C. section 9701, the Steele 
plaintiffs maintain that the conditions of a valid 
user fee are not satisfied. For instance, they allege 
that a user fee must be justified by a special benefit 
conferred by the government on the fee payer.96 Yet 
"no special benefit is provided to a tax return 
preparer who obtains or renews a PTIN because, in 
accordance with the Loving case and the U.S. Con-
stitution, a tax return preparer has a right to prepare 
returns for others for compensation."97 The Steele 
plaintiffs also allege that the amounts of the initial 
and renewal fees98 are greatly excessive because the 
functions that the fees are supposed to support are 
impermissible or have not actually been performed 
by the IRS.9'' 
The 14 counts for relief include declaratory judg-
ment that Treasury lacks statutory authority to 
charge initial and renewal PTIN fees or, alterna-
tively, declaratory judgment that the fees charged 
are excessive; a refW1d of fees already paid, with 
interest; and a permanent injunction prohibiting the 
charging of future initial or renewal PTIN fees or, 
alternatively, a permanent injunction prohibiting 
the charging of excessive future initial or renewal 
fees. 
The Steele plaintiffs must, of course, sail into the 
head winds of Brannen and Buckf et;, cases that 
upheld PTIN fees.100 Nonetheless, Steele raises sub-
stantial questions. The plaintiffs may have a better 
chance of prevailing on their alternative argument 
(that the fees are excessive in amount) than on their 
primary argument (that the fees are wholly invalid). 
95£d. at para. 13. However, the Buckley plaintiffs are expressly 
excluded from the purported class. Id. 
96/d. at paras. 90-91 (citing FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 
U.S. 345 (1974)). 
971d. at para. 93. 
98Tl1e fees are $50 initia lly and another $50 for each annual 
renewal. To each is added $14.25, a cha.rge paid to a third party 
to administer the process. T.D. 9501 (Sept. 2010 final regula-
tions). · 
99Steele complaint, sttpra note 94, at paras. 63-72 and 97-101. 
100fhe Eleventh Circuit did not find the issue to be close. 
Brannen, 682 F.3d at 1319 ("We readily conclude that, under the 
plain language of section 6109(a)(4), the PTIN is issued to tax 
return preparers for a special benefit. And we readily conclude 
that the benefit - the privilege of preparing tax returns for 
others for compensation - is the kind of 'special benefit' that 
qualifies lmder New England Power. The user fee here clearly 
confers a benefit which is not received by the general public."). 
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The Eleventh Circuit pointedly observed that what 
has become the Steele alternative argument was not 
before it in Brannen. 10 1 
Moreover, the landscape is different. The Elev-
enth Circuit handed down Brannen before Loving 
was decided. Loving, but not Ridgely, had been 
decided before Buckley, but the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Georgia did not discuss 
Loving at length. It may be in Steele that the D.C. 
district court - the court that decided both Loving 
and Ridgely - will find those decisions of greater 
relevance than the Buckley court did. 
IV. Possible Threats to Circular 230 
A. Evolution of Circular 230 
In an excellent concise history, Bryan T. Camp 
d1aracterized the history of the Treasury ethical 
rules as "one of ever-expanding regulation."102 The 
tax shelter wars have been an important driver of 
this expansion in recent decades. Treasury ethical 
rules increasingly were enlisted to combat shelters 
and other allegedly abusive arrangements.'°3 
In its current iteration, Circular 230 has five 
subparts. Subpart A consists of nine sections setting 
out rules governing the authority to practice before 
the IRS. For our purposes, the key provisions in-
volve section 10.3 regarding what kinds of persons 
may practice before the IRS and what they may do, 
plus related definitions in section 10.2. 
Reflecting the expansion of Circular 230, the 
definition of practice before the IRS has changed 
over the years. The 1966 iteration provided: "Nei-
ther preparation of a tax return nor the appearance 
of an individual as a witness for the taxpayer, nor 
the furnishing of information at the request of the 
[IRS] is considered practice before the Service."104 
However the June 12, 2014, version states that 
practice before the IRS: 
comprehends all matters connected with a 
presentation to the IRS relating to a taxpayer's 
rights, privileges, or liabilities under laws or 
regulations administered by the [IRS]. Such 
presentations include, but are not limited to, 
101682 F.3d at 1317, n.1 ("We note that Brannen has not 
challenged the amount or excessiveness of the user fee. lndeed, 
Brannen expressly disclaimed any such argument in the district 
court."). 
102Camp, supra note 6, at 457; see also Ariel Alvarez, "The 
Constitutionality of the Inevitable Regulation of All Tax Return 
Prefcarers," 14 / .. Accounting, Ethics & ('ub .. Po/'¥ 7~5 (2013) . . 
03See, e.g., Michael j. Desmond, "l he Continumg Evolution 
of Circular 230: Proposed Regulations Repealing the 'Covered 
Opinion' Standards, Imposing a General Competence Require-
ment and Expanding Existing Procedures to Ensure Compli· 
ance," 15 /. Tax Prac. & Proc. 23 (Dec. 2013-Jan. 2014). 
1°'131 F.R. 10773, 10774 (Aug. 13, 1966). 
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preparing documents; filing documents; corre-
sponding and communicating with the [IRS]; 
rendering written advice with respect to any 
entity, transaction, plan or arrangement, or 
other plan or arrangement having a potential 
for tax avoidance or evasion; and representing 
a client at conferences, hearings, and meet-
ings.1os 
Subpart B sets out 19 sections detailing duties 
and restrictions regarding practice before the IRS. 
The sections involve areas such as conduct when 
dealing with the IRS, t06 fees charged to clients, 107 
best practices and arrangements to foster them,10s 
standards for tax returns and others documents, iO<J 
competence,110 and written advice.111 
Portions of subpart B take the same expansive 
approach to practice before the IRS that section 10.2 
does. Section 10.27 provides: "A practitioner may 
not charge an unconscionable fee in connection 
with any matter before the [IRS]."112 It defines 
matter before the IRS as including: 
tax planning and advice, preparing or filing or 
assisting in preparing or filing returns or 
claims for refund or credit, and all matters 
connected with a presentation to the 
[IRS] ... relating to a taxpayer's rights, privi-
leges, or liabilities under laws or regulations 
administered by the [IRS]. Such presentations 
include, but are not limited to, preparing and 
filing documents, corresponding and commu-
nicating with the [IRS], rendering written ad-
vice with respect to any entity, transaction, 
plan or arrangement, and representing a client 
at conferences, hearings, and meetings. 113 
Other parts of subpart B refer to "matter" before 
the IRS or its equivalent without defining the term. 
Presumably, in at least some of these parts, the 
intent is to rely on the section 10.27 definition.11 4 ln 
10531 C.F.R. section 10.2(a)(4). 
111631 C.F.R. section 10.20 (information to be furnished to the 
IRS), section 10.21 (advising the IRS of client's omissions), 
section 10.22 (diligence on accuracy), and section I0.23 (prompt 
dis~osition of pending matters). 
0731 C.F.R. section 10.27. Section 10.27(b) regarding contin-
gent fees was at issue in Ridgely. 
10831 C.F.R. sections 10.33 and 10.36-10.38. 
10931 C.F.R. section 10.34. 
11031 C.F.R. St.>etion 10.35. 
11131 C.F.R. section 10.37. 
11231 C.F.R. section 10.27(a). 
1n31 C.F.R. section 10.27(c)(2). 
114E.g., 31 C.F.R. section 10.30(a)(l) (restrictions on advertis-
ing and solicitation) and section 10.30(d) (prohibiting a practi-
tioner "in matters related to the" IRS from assisting, or 
accepting assistance from, "any person or entity who, to the 
knowledge of the practitioner, obtains clients or otherwise 
practices in a manner forbidden under this section"). 
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other situations, however, matter before the LRS is 
limited by context to a later phase in the process.us 
Subpart C contains four sections addressing sanc-
tions for violation of the regulations. Possible sanc-
tions indude censure, sus pension, disbarment, and 
monetary penalties. 116 Sanctions may be imposed 
under any of these circumstances: "if the practitioner 
is shown to be incompetent or disreputable (within 
the meaning of section 10.51), 117 fails to comply with 
any regulation in this part (under the prohibited 
conduct standards of section 10.52), or with intent to 
defraud, willfully and knowingly misleads or threat-
ens a client or prospective client." 118 
" Part" means part 10 of title 31 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, in other words, the whole of 
Circular 230. However, section 10.52 somewhat 
mrngates this broad sweep. First, section 10.33 lays 
out best practices for tax advisers. Because those 
best practices are primarily aspirational, failing to 
conform to them is not sanctionable. 119 Second, 
violations of Circular 230 rules generally are sanc-
tionable only if they are committed willfully. 120 
However, recklessness or gross incompetence suf-
fices when the rules violated are section 10.34 
(standards regarding tax returns and documents), 
section 10.35 (competence), section 10.36 (proce-
dures to ensure compliance), or section 10.37 (re-
quirements for written advice).121 
Subpart D contains 23 sections setting out rules 
applicable to disciplinary proceedings, and subpart 
E has four general provisions. 
B. Sting in the Recent Cases 
Two aspects of Loving and Ridgely pose dangers 
to aspects of Circular 230 beyond the particular 
regulations at issue in, and invalidated by, those 
decisions. They are (1) the threshold the cases offer 
for tht! commencement of practice before the IRS, 
and (2) the spirit in whlch, or the level of rigor with 
which, the court performs the Chevron s tep one 
inquiry. These are described below. 
1. Commencement of practice before the IRS. Both 
Ridgely and Loving held that the plaintiff's activities 
11 ~for instance, S<.'Ction J0.20{a)(l) requires the practitioner to 
"promptly submit records and information in any matter be-
fore" the IRS, absent a reastmable, g<xx.l-foi th btdid that the 
material i:; privileged. This duty operates once there has been "a 
proper and lawful request by a duly authorized officer or 
employee" of U1e IRS, which presupposes that an audit or other 
IRS-taxpayer int('ractive process already has begun. 
11631 C.F.R. section 10.SO(a) and (c). 
117Section 10.51(a) identifies 18 categories of incompetence 
and disreputable conduct, and this enu1neration is iUustrative, 
not exhaustive. 
11831 C.F.R section 10.SO(a). 
11 <>31 C.F.R. ~'lion 10.52(a)(l). 
IW[tf. 
12 131 C.F.R. st?cti1•n 10.52(a)(2). 
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were outside the permissible scope of regulation 
because they preceded the point at whlch there was 
a representative engaged in practice before the IRS. 
But it is unclear precisely where the courts loca ted 
that point. Within and between themselves, the 
cases arc in tension. 
Loving addressed the preparation and filing of 
tax retums. The circuit court's opinion endorsed as 
"succinct and cogently explained" the following 
passage from the Loving district court opinion: 
Filing a tax rehun would never, in normal 
usage, be described as "presenting a case." At 
the time of filing, the taxpayer has no dispute 
with the IRS; there is no "case" to present. This 
definition makes sense only in connection 
with those who assist taxpayers in the exami-
nation and appeals stage of the process. 122 
The circuit court added that " the statute contem-
plates representation in a contested proceeding" 123 
and that practice before an agency or court "ordi-
narily refers to practice during an investigation, 
adversarial hearing, or other adjudkative proceed-
ing."124 
Ridgely addressed the preparation and filing of 
what it called ordinary refund claims - that is, 
claims the taxpayer filed after she filed her retmn or 
thal she filed during the course of an IRS audit, but 
in either case filed before she commenced a refund 
suit. The court endorsed the plaintiff's position that 
the taxpayer's adviser "would not be legally repre-
senting the taxpayer until the lRS responds to the 
cfajm and the CPA submits a power of attomey." 125 
ln other words, the adviser is not a representative 
engaged in practice "before the commencement of 
any adversarial proceedings with the lRS or any 
formaJ legal representation by lhe CPA."126 
The Ridgely court returned to that theme later in 
its opinion. After quoting the portions of Loving 
discussed above, the Ridgely court likened the situ-
ation before it to that in Lovhw: "The process of 
122742 F.3d at 1018 (quoting <l17 F. Supp.2d at 74). 
12-17-12 F.3d at 1020. 
124 /d. at 1018. 
t2"20l4 U.S. Di~t. LEXIS 96447, at •4. 126/d. (emphasis in the original). Thi ::; formulatinn is s lightly 
rewurkcd in the order the Ridgely courl entered tm the same day 
it handed down its opinion. TI1e order provided in part as 
follnws: 
ORDERED that (Treasury i111d the IRS] lack s tatutory 
authority to promulgate· or enforce th..: restrictions on 
contingent foe arrangements, as delineated in 31 C.F.R. 
St,'<"tion 10.27, with respt,>c:t to the preparation and filing of 
Ordinary Refund Claims, whe re " preparation and flli.ng" 
precedt.'S the inception ~)f any examination or adjudica-
tion of the refund claim by the IRS a"d any formal legal 
reprei.entation on the part of the practitioner. 
Ridgely, 20 14 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96447 (D.D.C. July 16, 2014). 
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filing an Ordinary Refund Claim - again, before 
any back-and-forth with the IRS - is similar to the 
process of filing a tax return h1 that both take place 
prior to any type of adversariaJ assessment of the 
taxpayer's Uability."121 
There are several discordancics in these Loving 
and Ridgely formulations. A dlief one is that they 
sometimes emphasize the element of conflict (the 
IRS must have actuaJJy disagreed with the taxpayer 
dbout the return or the claim), while at other times 
th('Y emphasize a formaJ event or stage in the 
process (such as commencement of an audit or 
Appeals Office hearing, or the filing of a power of 
attorney form with the IRS). 
These divergent formulations could point to dif-
ferent moments for when the Rubicon has been 
crossed. For instance, Ridgely identified the filing of 
the power of attorney form as a possible crossover 
point, but neither Loving opinion did so. Moreover, 
an CRS audit certainly involves back-and-forth, but 
it need not be contested or adversarial The IRS's 
goal in examining a return is to determine true tax 
liability, not to skin the taxpayer out of every dollar 
possible. •2R Many audits are closed on a no-change 
basis or even with the determination of an overpay-
ment. 
ln a detailed and insightful article, Camp has 
argued that £RS aud its are best understood as 
inquis itorial rather than advcrsarial. 129 Some Tax 
Court judges took this theme even further, main-
taining that we should "view a tax triaJ as being 
investigatory in nature rather than a simple adver-
sary proceeding." 130 Whether one goes that far 
regarding tax trials, there is much to commend the 
view that - at least from the JRS's standpoint -
the taxpayer should not at the audit stage be 
perceived as an adversary.1:11 
Other ambiguities exist as well. The Loving circuit 
court referred to an "adjudicative proceeding'' but 
did not define that concept. We often associate it 
with cases tried in court or trial-type hearings 
before administrative law judges, but the APA uses 
the term more broadly. Under the APA, adjudka-
1272014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96447, at •16. 
12$£.g., Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689. 
12
')Camp, "Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and 
the PMli:i l P11radigm Shift in the lnk•rnal Revenue Service 
Rt•s trucluring and R~form Act of 1998," 56 fla. Tax Rev. 1, 17-78 
(20<.~. 
1 fheodore Tannenwald Jr., ''Tax Trials: A View Prom the 
Bench," 59 ABA f. 295, 295 (1973); see also Meade Whitaker, 
"Som,_, fhoughts on Current Practice," 7 Vtz. 1ax Rev. 421, 
437-43R (198R), and Tannenwald, "The Ervin N. Griswold Lec-
ture," 15 Am. f. Tax Pol'y l, 7-8 (1998). 
''.\'See, 1•.g., Loving, 742 F.3d at 101R ("the IRS conducts it:. 
own ... non-adversarial a~>SSment of the taxpayer's liability"). 
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tion is an "agency process for the formulation of an 
order,''132. and an order is "the whole or a part of a 
final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, in-
junctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a 
matter other than rule making but including licens-
ing."•a'1 Tax lawyers are not accustomed to thinking 
of the 1RS as an adjudicatory body, but withl_n this 
framework of the APA, many kinds of IRS actions 
and decisions constitute adjudications. 134 Did the 
D.C. Circuit mean adjudicative proceeding to be 
understood from an everyday perspective or an 
APA perspective? 
Even if the latter, we still are not out of the 
woods. The above APA definition refers to a "final 
disposition." Typically, finality requires two ele-
ments. First, the action must be the consummation 
of the agency's deliberative process, not merely a 
tentative view. Second, the action must determine 
rights and obligations; legal consequences must 
flow from it.13s The notion of finality shoves to later 
in the process the point at which the [RS can 
properly be said to have adjudicated. Issuance of a 
statutory notice of deficiency (90-day letter) by the 
IRS is a finaJ order in APA terms. Issuance of a 
revenue agent's report (30-day letter} by the CRS is 
not a final order. t36 
Similar ambiguity exists in Ridgely. Ridgely's ref-
erence to "adversarial assessment" evokes the defi-
ciency process under which the IRS often can.not 
assess additional income, estate, or gift taxes with-
out first issuing a notice of deficiency and allowing 
an opportunity for prepayment review of the merits 
by the Tax Court.137 But the issuance of a notice of 
deficiency comes after audit and often after JRS 
Appeals Office considera tion. Did the court intend 
to push the decisive moment so late in the process? 
"Assessment" has an w1derstood term of art 
meaning in tax parlance.1Js Ccner<1list judges often 
use the term imprecisely, but docs mere sloppiness 
explain the Ridgely court's use of it? That explana-
tion would be undercut by the fact that the Loving 
ms u.s.c. section 551(7). 
l:l15 U.S.C. section 551(6); see Alan 6. Morrison, "Adminis-
trative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and Courts - Except 
When They're Not," 59 Adm/11. L. /{(!v. 79, 98 (2007) ("under llw 
APA, any agency action that i~ not a rulemaking is an adjudi· 
cation"). 
1 3~See Johnson, "Reasoned Rxpbinati1)n and IRS Adjudica-
tion," 63 Duke L. /. 1771, 1792- IROO (2014). 
1J"E.g., Be11nett i>. Spe(lr, 520 U.S. 154, 177- 178 (1997). 
1:'16A 90-day letter is the offkial dett•rmination of the IRS. A 
30-d~· letter is not. £.g., !'ection (>212(a). 
1
"' See sections 6211 through 6213. 
1311See st"Ctions 6201 through 6204; U11ited SI.ates v. Galletti, 541 
U.S. 114, 122 (2004). 
TAX NOTES, January 12, 2015 
district court began its analysis by defining assess-
ment,139 as did the Ridgely court.140 If that was not a 
result of sloppiness, then was Ridgely intentionally 
pushing until late in the process the commencement 
of "practice before the IRS"? 
In short, both Loving and Ridgely tell us, in their 
respective contexts, that the Circular 230 provisions 
there at issue misconstrued when practice before 
the IRS starts . However, the cases do not leave us 
with a settled understanding of the point, moment, 
phase, or event that marks the commencement of 
practice. Precision in this regard was not needed to 
decide the particular questions in Loving and Rid-
gely. Future cases may well require greater clarity. 
2. Rigor of Chevron step one analysis. Along with 
the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit and its district 
court are at the center of the great battles of admin-
istrative law. 141 Loving and Ridgely were decided as 
they were because of, and reflecting shifts in, the 
dominant judicial approach to Chevron in adminis-
trative law, especially in the D.C. Circuit. 
It once was thought that Chevron was a "super-
deferential approach,"142 and that may once have 
been so.143 But fashion, the prevalence of 3-D mov-
ies, and judicial styles of interpretation change over 
time. Many cases would have been decided differ-
ently had they reached the courts at a different time, 
when a different interpretational approach held 
sway. As relevant here, in recent years, there has 
been a tum in administrative law back toward 
congressional primacy. Judicial deference to agen-
cies has weakened as a result.144 
A subtle but impor:tant shift has occurred in how 
judges frame the question - a shift from "I'll 
uphold the agency action unless Congress prohib-
ited the agency from wielding this power" to "I'll 
uphold the agency action only if Congress gave the 
agency this power." As a practical matter, a judge 
laboring under the former approach is predisposed 
to hold for the agency. Less so is the judge operating 
under the latter approach. 
139917 F. Supp.2d at 69-70. 
1 ~02014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS %447, at .. 2. 
141 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, "Does the Solicitor General Advantage 
Thwart the Rule of Law in the Administrative State?" 28 Fla. St. 
U. L. Rev. 459, 460-461 (2000). 
142£.g., William D. Popkin, Materials on Legislation: Political 
l.anr.iuage and the Political Process 611 (2009). 
~3But see Richard ). Pierce Jr., "What Do the Studies of 
Judicial Review of Agency Action Mean?" 63 Admin. L. Rev. 77 
(2011) (finding that federaJ courts uphold agency actions about 
70 percent of the time, regardless of whether Chevron or alter-
native standards of review are applied). 
144See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman, "The Turn Toward Congress in 
Administrative Law," 89 B.U. L. Rev. 727 (2009); Johnson, supra 
note 5, at 113-114. 
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Chevron spoke not just of explicit congressional 
conferrals of power on agencies. It also ventured 
that statutory gaps can constitute implicit delega-
tions. L45 That formulation is favorable ground for 
the agency. Implicit delegation, however, was de-
emphasized in later cases.146 Those cases, including 
recent Supreme Court tax decisions, continue to 
define delegation as a key aspect of Chevron, and 
their main focus is explicit, not implicit, delega-
tion.147 
A key case in the current delegation-oriented 
approach to Chevron is the Supreme Court's 2013 
decision in City of Arlington v. FCC.14s The agency 
prevailed in that case, with the majority holding 
that Chevron applies to an agency's determination of 
the scope of its jurisdiction. This might seem pro-
agency. It is not. The majority, in an opinion written 
by Justice Antonin Scalia, stressed that Chevron 
review - in jurisdiction cases as in all cases - is to 
be exacting, not indulgent. Near the beginning, the 
majority opinion stated: "No matter how it is 
framed, the question a court faces when confronted 
with an agency's interpretation of a statute it ad-
ministers is always, simply, whether the agency has 
stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority" 
(emphasis in the original).149 
At the end of its opinion, the CihJ of ArlinRton 
majority reemphasized: "The fox-in-the-henhouse 
syndrome is to be avoided ... by taking seriously, 
and applying rigorously, in all cases, statutory limits 
on agencies' authority. Where Congress has estab-
lished an ambiguous line, the agency can go no 
further than the ambiguity will fairly allow.111so 
None of the nine justices - whether in the majority, 
115Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 
199, 231 (1974). 
116£.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-227 
(2001) ("We hold that administrative implementation of a par-
ticular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when 
it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the 
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in 
the exercise of that authority"); see Stephen M. Johnson, "Bring-
ing Deference Back (But for How Long?)," 57 Cath. L. Rev. 1 
(2007). 
147£.g., United States v. Home Concrete & Supply LLC, 132 S. Ct. 
1836, 1843-1844 (2012); and Mayo Foundation for Medical Educa-
tion and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713-714 (2011). 
For discussion of Home Concrete, see Johnson, "Reflections on 
Home Concrete: Writing Tax Regulations and Interpreting Tax 
Statutes," 13 Fla. St. U. Bus. Rev. 77 (2014). For discussion of 
Mayo, see Johnson, "Preserving Fairness in Tax Administrntion 
in the Mayo Era," 32 Va. Tax Rev. 269 (2012); and Johnson, "Mayo 
and the Future of Tax Regulations," Tax Notes, Mar. 28, 2011, p. 
1547. 
148City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863. 
1191d. at 1868. 
150/d. at 1874. 
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in concurrence, or in dissent - disputed the p ropo-
sition that Chevron step one review should be rig-
orous. 
The Supreme Court handed down City of Arling-
ton between the district court's and circuit court's 
opinions in Loving. Despite preceding City of Arling-
ton, the district court opinion applied a rigorous, 
nondeferential style of analysis at Chevron step 
one.151 The Loving circuit court's opinion was un-
mistakably influenced by City of Arlington. The 
opinion quoted City of Arlington in both the first and 
last paragraphs of its analytical portion. 1s2 Unsur-
prisingly, early in its opinion, the Ridgely court also 
quoted City of Arlington.15:1 
The "construe the delegation rigorously" ap-
proach of City of Arlington continues to be the 
dominant conception of Chevron. A June 2014 Su-
preme Court decision quoted CihJ of Arlington in 
support of this proposition: "Even under Chev-
ron ... agencies must operate within the bounds of 
reasonable interpretation."154 And a September 
2014 circuit court case remarked: "An administra-
tive agency's authority is necessarily derived from 
the statute it administers and may not be exercised 
in a manner ... inconsistent with" what Congress 
ordained.155 
Nonetheless, pendulums swing. The fact that 
rigorous step one analysis is in vogue now guaran-
tees nothing for the future. Chevron cases are liti-
gated every day the courts are open. The equities of 
these cases will always influence doctrine, as will 
the ever-shifting perceived necessities of the time. 
A significant current area of controversy involves 
Chevron and tax aspects of the Affordable Care Act. 
On July 22, 2014, panels of the D.C. Circuit and the 
Fourth Circuit issued conflicting opinions in this 
controversy. Sections 1311(b)(l) and 1321(c) of the 
ACA encourage states to establish exchanges 
through which individuals can buy medical insur-
ance. Thirty-four states have chosen not to do so, 
however. Accordingly, under section 1321(c)(l) of 
the act, the Department of Health and Human 
Services has set up federal exchanges in those 
states. 
15
'Sec Johnson, supra note 5, at 113-120. 
152742 F.3d at 1016, 1022. 
1532014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96447, at *13. 
154Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 
(2014). The Court particularly warned against deference that 
"would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion 
in [the agency's) regulatory authority without clear congressio-
nal authorization." Id. at 2444. That is just what the regulation 
invalidated in Loving did. 
15~ Unitcrl States v. Transocean Deepwater Drilling Inc., 767 F.3d 
485, 489 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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Section 368, added to the tax code by the ACA, 
authorizes a tax credit for persons buying insurance 
through an exchange "established by the State 
under section 1311." 156 Taken literally, this language 
would not make the credit available to those who 
buy insurance through the federal exchange estab-
lished in the state in lieu of the state establishing its 
own exchange. However, by regulation, Treasury 
has interpreted section 36B broadly and made the 
credit available as well to customers of those federal 
"in lieu of" exchanges.157 The validity of that regu-
lation has been challenged. 
In Halbig v. Burwell, over a dissent and reversing 
the trial court, a panel of the D.C. Circuit concluded 
that the statute unambiguously restricts the section 
36B credit to insurance purchased on state-
established exchanges and so invalidated the regu-
lation at Chevron step one. 1ss On the same day, in 
King v. Burwell, a panel of the Fourth Circuit, 
unanimously and affirming the trial court, upheld 
the same regulation under Chevrvn.159 
Since then, a district court has agreed with the 
Ha.lbig decision;160 the D.C. Circuit, vacating the 
panel decision, has granted en bane review of 
Halbig;161 and the Supreme Court has granted cer-
tiorari in King.162 Even if the regulation at issue is 
ultimately upheld, that would not undermine the 
conclusion that Chevron step one inquiries are con-
ducted in a rigorous manner. It is settled that the 
step one analysis looks at the statutory language in 
context, not in isolation. 163 The role of the section 
36B credit in the total scheme of the ACA's opera-
tion provides significant (though not necessarily 
decisive) contextual support for the interpretation 
enshrined in the regulation. 164 
Moreover, a pro-government result in the section 
36B controversy would not necessarily have spill-
over utility to the government in Circular 230 cases. 
The Supreme Court has cautioned against courts 
placing too much weight in interpretation on ap-
parent anomalies within statutes. 165 That principle 
may excuse anomalies within the ACA, which 
consists of 10 titles stretching to more than 900 
1~ction 36B(b)(2)(A). 
157Reg. section 1.36B-2(a)(1). 
158758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
159759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014). 
1600klahoma v. Bunvell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139501 (E.D. 
Okla. Sept. 30, 2014). 
1612014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014). 
1625. Ct. Dkt. No. 14-114 (cert. granted Nov. 7, 2014). 
•('3£.g., Nat'l Ass'11 of f-lome Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 
U.S. 644, 666 (2007); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 
(1997). 
164See King, 759 F.3d at 374. 
16sE.g.1 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 
2024, 2033-2034 (2014). 
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pages.1'"' Les'> intcrprctational mdulgcnc(• would be 
appropriate for thr .,hort 31 U.S.C <;('Chon 330. 
C. Potentially Vulnerable Circu lar 230 Provisjons 
We have '>t't'n th,11 U.nimx ,md Ruixdy (1) reflect 
the dominant i1pprottt h of rigorou.,, nondeforcntia1 
review of .1gt.-ncy authority and .,t,1lutory clarity at 
01ewon '>tep onr; (2) identify 11 U.S.C. !>fftion 
330(a) as the foundation of frcasury's ability to 
impose proft•.,.,1onal ~pon'>1bility rut~ Lhrough 
Circular 230; (3) allow tho-.c rule ... only to the extent 
they bear on n.•prcscnt.1tivc-. engagl'<.i m practice 
before the IRS, (4) limit "rcpre~ntativcs" to persons 
who act as .1gcnts of taxpayNs in dealing with the 
IRS and who possess lhC' lega l ,1ulho rily lo act on 
the behalf of their taxpayer~; .rntl (5) define practke 
as commencing only at some nol yet precisely 
marked lim<' or cv0n t invtllving (a) presentation to 
the IRS of "' powt'r o f .rnorncy, (b) the existence of 
an actual db.pule bC'lwcen the tci xpayer and the IRS, 
or (c} the? ... tart of .111 audit, a ~imilM IRS action, or an 
adjudicatory proccs.,. 
Unles'> further litigation causes the courts to 
retreat from lhl>se posilions, many portions of Cir-
cular 230, not 1ust those ~~>c1fically at issue in 
LouinK or R1dgcly, could be m pt•ril of invdlidation if 
cha1lengl'CI. I will not attempt below to develop this 
thought cxhau<>tively. lnste,1d, llw frx.·us will be on 
some of tht• more import.mt portions that may be in 
jeopardy 
1. Section 10.22. &'(lion 10.22 of Circular 230 re-
qui~ that cl pr,11. htionl'r t''NCI.'>(' due diligence 
regarding accur,1cy in thre~ situations: 
1. in pn:>p.uing or assisting in the pr<.'paration 
of, approving, ;ind filing tax r<'lurns, docu-
ments, tlnd o ther papers relating to I IRSJ mat-
tC?rs; 
2. in drlt•rminlng thl' rom•ctnt•ss of oral or 
writt<.'n rt•prt'scnlalions mctde by the practitio-
ner to lhe Department of th(• Treasury; and 
3. in d<'tNmining the com.>ctnc<>s of oral and 
written rt'prt"•<'ntilllons made by lht? practitio-
ner to clients with re-.pcc.t lo <lny matter ad-
min1slcr1.'d by lht' [IRSJ 1"~ 
This n.•gul,1llon 1., not fac1.1ll) invalid, but under 
recent C<lSt''>, 11 may b<.' invalid ,,., ,1pplit-d m some 
situations. If tht• rcfcrt•nccd ,1chvilil"> tc1kc place in 
interaction-. w ith IRS pcrsonn<.'I ,1ftc.•r the c;tart of an 
audit, lht•1r n.•gulahon undc.>r Circular 230 section 
1022 likely would be uphl'ld under Ltrving and 
1
'"'NrlR, 112 S ll "' 2580. 
1r,;.ll <.. I K ... 1'<:t111n 10.22(a). 
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Ridgely. I( tht>y occur eMlil'r than that, regulation, 
and Lhc imposition of <.ancllon<> for violation, would 
seem to be in peril. 
2. Section 10.27. Section 10 27 ,1ddrc<>SCS fees that 
practitionN"> charge their clit.>nts. fhis c;ccbo n 's limi-
tation on contingent fcc.,•M was ill bsuc in, and was 
partially invahdat<.'d by, Rulg1•/11. However, the sec-
tion a lso rnntains a mort• gl•neral prohibition: "A 
practitioner may not charge an unconscionable fee 
in connection with any math.•r bt..•forc" the IRS. 1&9 As 
seen m Part IV./\ above, Lht.> "<.'Clion defines a matter 
before the IR5 bmadly.1"' 
The Ridgely plaintiff did not ask the court to 
invalidat<.• th<.' g<.'ncral unconscionability provision, 
and tht> c.1.;<.' d id no t, .1 ... ,, form,11 mf!llPr, <lfff'ct it. 
However, the logic of the case applies to the general 
unconscionable fees rule as fully as it does to the 
specific conlingc.•nl fees rule. 
3. Section 10.29. Largely tracking general ethical 
rules, 171 section 10.29 providl'~, with sta ted excep-
tions, that ''.l practitionrr shclll not represent a client 
before tht' 11 RS I if the rt'pre:..cnt,1tion involves a 
conflict of interest," which the -.eclion then de-
fines. 172 
The key to the va lidity of this provision in a 
/.JJvi11,~ / R1d~t·l11 environment 1s, of rnurse, the scope 
of "before the IRS." In that contC?xt, this rule would 
be cnfom.•abk• o nly after the practitioner has be-
come a "n•pre..cntative" and the process has ma-
tured into "practice" ,1s tho~ tcr~ are defined in 
the caS<'s. 
4. Section 10.34. 5'.>ction 10.34 ~ts out standards for 
tax rc'lumc; and docum<.>nts, affidavits, and other 
papers. It (I) prohibiL<> prnchtionc~ from advising 
clien ts to tak(• unreasonable positions on returns or 
refund clt1im!>, 111 and (2) rc.•quires practitioners to 
apprise clients of potential p<.•m1ltics for returns and 
othe r documl•nls submitll'd to tlw IRS. 174 To the 
exten t tlw~w C1nd other rules apply lo return prepa-
ration and other pre-audit aclvic<', they are at risk 
under Loving ;ind l~idgcly. 
5. Section 10.36. Section 10.36 l'stablishcs proce-
dul"<.'s to C'nc:;ur<.' compli.mct• IL provides in part as 
foll owe;: 
Any individu.11 .,ubjt>et to !Circular 230) who 
hac:; principal authority and rt'Sponsibility 
for ovcr...t'<.'ing tl firm''> pr.11.tict' governed by 
11
"'31 C I R '>l'Clion I0.27(b). 
""':11 C. I K ~'Ct1t1n I0.27(a) 
1~1 <.. I R '\t."Cl1vn I0.27(c). 
171Sr.· \ml•rican Bar J\'>'>OCl.lhllO ~loJd Kulc 1.7; and Dn't:l-
opmr111~ 111 tire L.a,,• - C'o1111ic '' 11( l11t.•r. ... 1 m l/rr l .fX"I Pmfession, 'J-1 
H11ro. I Rc·v 12-14 ( l!JXl). 
1721 I ( f R '>l'\:llon 10.29(.i), {b). 
17 
'11 (. I· R ~'Ct111n IO.'.W(J), (h). 
1713 l <.. hit '>l't'tmn 10.'.W(c). 
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lhis part, including the provision of advice 
concerning FedcraJ tax matte rs and prepara-
tion of tax returns, claims for refund, or other 
documents for submission to the (IRS], must 
take reasonable steps to ensure that the firm 
has adequate procedures in effect for aU mem-
bers, associates, and employees for purposes 
of complying with [Circula r 230]. ln the ab-
sence of a person or persons identified by the 
firm as having the principaJ authority and 
responsibility described in this paragraph, the 
IIRS] may identify one or more individu-
als . .. respons ible for compliance w ith the re-
quirements.175 
The IRS has not often attempted to enforce 
Ci rcuJar 230 section 10.36. Overseers are tutlikely to 
be held sanctionable when the overseen themselves 
arc not. lf the above observations about Circular 230 
have force regarding the duties of line practitioners, 
they also would seem to apply to Lhc duties of thei r 
supervisors. 
6. Section 10.37. Section 10.37 is poten tially among 
U1€' more important of the sections not formaJJy a l 
issue in recent cases but perhaps imperiled by them. 
At Ll'le stages of its development, adoption, and 
amendment, this section and its predecessors have 
received more att.cntion from tax practjtioners than 
most other prt?scriptions and proscriptions in Cir-
cu la r 230. 1711 
Treasury reworked the rules now in section 10.37 
several times over the last three decades as part of 
the war against tax shelters. Key rules formerly 
were lodged in section 10.35. They migrated into 
section 10.37 via Circular 230 amendments pro-
posed in 2012 and finalized in 2014.177 
Subject to various implementing rules, section 
l 0.37 requires that a practitioner: 
i. base the written advice on reason<1ble factual 
and legal assumptions ... ; 
ii. reasonably consider all re leva nt facts and 
circumstances that the practitioner knows or 
reasonably should know; 
iii. use reasonable efforts to idcntif y and ascer-
tain the facts rc lC'va.nt to written advice on 
each Federal lax matter; 
iv. not rely upon representations, sta tements, 
fincLings, or agreements ... of the taxpayer or 
any other person if reliance on them would be 
unreasonable; 
1;-t;3 I C.F.R. section 10.36(a). 
17
"See, e.g., T<>bin ct al., supra note 1, at 204 (noting that rut~ 
;mcestral to the curn:nt section 10.37 " have received a Int of 
foclL'> from the tax bar, and there have lx.-en a lot of complainb 
that !they gol too rar" ). 
177St•e Desmond, ,;1qm1 note 103, at 23-24. 
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v. relate applicable law and authorities to facts; 
and 
vi. nol, in evaluating a Federa l tax matter, take 
into accOllnt the possibility lhat a tax return 
will not be audited or that a matter w ill not be 
raised on aud it. 178 
The section defines a fodcrd l tax matter as "any 
matter concerning the application or interpretation 
of [inter alia any] law or reguJation administered 
by" the [RS.17<) 
Clearly, this is directed a t written advice ren-
dered before a return has been selected for audit, 
before the commencement of an adjudicatory pro-
cess, and before the occu rronce of any other 
taxpayer-I.RS or adviser-IRS interactions. [f the ap-
proach of Loving and Ridgely s tands, one foot of 
section 10.37 is on the gallows and the other foot is 
on a banana peet.11;10 
7. Some possible rejoinders. The Ridgely court 
s tressed that apart from the challenge to the section 
10.27(b) contingent fee ru les, " the parties have not 
raised, ru1d the Court expresses no view on, the 
IRS's authori ty to issue and enforce standa rdf; of 
practice by representatives under other subsec-
tions" of Circular 230.1s1 Thal observation may ring 
differently lo different ears. To the government, it 
might be a sweet invitation to develop better ve-
hicles than section 330(a), which broke down in 
Loving and Ridgely. To potential future plaintiffs, it 
might be a sonorous tattoo of future troubles; they 
may have to meet arguments s tronger than section 
330(a). From whichever perspective, it wouJd be 
surprising indeed if the dcdded and pending cases 
described in Section ID above were the last Clwz1ro11 
challenges to aspects of Circular 230. 
ln future cases, the 1RS may attempt to distin-
guish Loving and Ridgely, idcaUy lo cabin them to 
their facts, by adverting Lo factual differences. The 
government's effort along thal line fell flat in Rid-
gely. The government noted that L.ouing and Ridgely 
involved different types o( plaintiffs - non-CPA 
preparers in the former but a CPA in the latlt'r -
and different provisions of Circular 230 - sections 
10.3 to 10.6 in t.he former but section 10.27 in the 
lalter. 1112 Those were dis tinctions, to be sure, but 
without meaningfuJ differencc.1111 
17831 C.F.R. ::.cctiun 10.37(a)(2). 
17931 C.F.R. section 10.37(d). 
18!1See, t'.g., Madara, "Court Rclie:1 on Loving in Striking 
Down ContinHcnt Ft-e Ruk.'S," Tax Nalt'S, July 21, 2014, p. 242 
(describing the views of Stuart Bassin, counsel for the plnintiffs 
in Steele, di:.cu::.sed in Section Ul.C.2). 
181Ritlgel.1f, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96+17, a t •12, n.3. 
18z/d. at 414. 
163/d. 
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Alterna tively, the govC'mmcnt m.ight attempt to 
cast a thread of connection over the divide identi-
fied by thl" rec<'nt cascs the divide between what 
is potentially controversial (thus constituting prac-
tice and Lhercby subjl"CI to rt>gula tion under 31 
U.S.C. S<'Ction 330(a)) and whi'lt is merely prepara-
tory (LhtLo; non-practicl" cmd not s ubject to regula-
tion). The govemmml tried to do so in Ridgely, 
justifying the challenged Circular 230 rules as 
means to prevent the "c'<plo itlation of) the audit 
sclcction proc<'ss" by ovcrreflching prcparers. •tw But 
this was Palsgrnfian . 'K"' Chaos theory teUs us that a 
chain of "but for" connections may Link a butterfly 
Aapping its wings in Braz il to a tornado in Texas.186 
Whatever dcgrcr of truth Lha l may possess in the 
abstract, in the eyes or the law, the thread of 
connection cit somC' point becomes so attenuated 
that it snaps under ils own weight.'ll7 As in Ridgely, 
metaphysical possibilities do not trump statutory 
text and context. 
V. How the Tax System M ig ht Respond 
Assume tht1t the train of litigation outcomes 
continues to roll down Lhc tracks laid in Loving and 
Ridgely and, thuc;, that th<.• portions of GrcuJar 230 
identified t1bovc m S..'Ction IV.C as being at risk are 
in fact invalidated. This is far from a certainty, but it 
is a possibility. Should thal future dawn, what 
would the cthkal dimension of federal tax practice 
look like? 
The answer to lht1t question depends on what, if 
any, direct o r collateral corrections arc made. That 
action could involve onC' or more of the following: 
(1) federal legislation to strcnglhcn 31 U.S.C. section 
330(a); (2) non-l<'gislat ivt' fodt'rnl responses, such as 
greater cmphMis on civ il or crimina l penalties, 31 
U.S.C. section 330{d), 3 I U.S.C. section 330(b), other 
federa l s tatutes, or "voluntary" programs empha-
sizing incentives instl'ad of commands; or (3) non-
federa l responses, such as s tate regulation and 
maJpracticc actions brought by aggrieved taxpay-
ers. 
1 ~/41 at 'I. 
'"SC/ Pa/sgrof ''· '""~ 1~t1111J R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) 
(holdmg that ach. that ill'l' the "bul for" cau:.e of injUI) still are 
not actionable in tort 1( tlw conn~>chon between the acl:l> and the 
in1urie:. ~ too ind"'.'<.I t\r rcm1>h: in probabihtv). 
•st•se .. , '\II·, Robl>rt C. I lilbom, "Sea Gulb, Butterflies. and 
Grasshopper;· A Brid 111-;tory or the 13uttl•rfly Effect in onlin-
ear ~amics," 72 Am. I /)hl(S1r:; 425 (2004). 167Sl't', l'.g., Sm1tlt i• Ci>11m11s:;11mcr, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939) 
(rejectini; a but-for tt."il fur dctl•rminmg whether cost!, are 
deductible as ordinary tllld llL"Ct.">:-My businei,s expenses). aff d 
per c11ri111111 I l:l P.2d 11.J (2c1 Cir 11)40). 
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A. Fede ral Legisla tion 
Lo11i11g and Rtd~dy, and future cases that may 
follow their lead, art> or w ill be s tatutory, not 
constitutional, dl>cisioni>. Ac; such, they always can 
be reversed legis lative ly. Congress can amend 31 
U.S.C. section 330 anytime it w ishes to s hore up the 
delegation of rulemaking power on which Circular 
230 rests. 
Some effort.:; are being mad<.' to do just that for 
the issue in LmimK: reg ulation of return preparers. 
Treas ury, th<' IRS, .rnd some others believe that 
greater regula tio n o f preparers is critically impor-
tant to the viability of the tax system and the 
protection of American taxpayers. 11!/S They also be-
lieve tha t Lhc ultimntc solution to the problem is 
legjs lation to provide the s tatutory basis fetmd 
Jacking in Lovi11~.111•J 
Bills have bc.>cn introdLJccd, and some hearings 
have been held . Som<' bills take the direction one 
would expect - lhat is, lhey would, if enacted, 
expand Treasury's statutory authority to prescribe 
professional respons ibility rules for practice before 
the TRS.1Q(l But those proposals saiJ into s tiff head 
winds of political opposiljon, in no smaU part 
because of remarkably maladroit navigation by the 
lRS in recent yc>ars. The> JRS's inappropriate process-
ing of a pplications for tax exemption by 
conservative-leaning groups, its inept handling of 
resultant congressional inquiries, waste and irre-
sponsibi lity in some> TRS training programs, and 
isolated acts of partisanship and illegality by incli-
v idual IRS employees all ht1ve created a hostile 
climate for the IRS on Capitol Hill. 1111 As a resuJt, the 
lRS's budget is Laking big hits, 1•12 and the appetite 
for legis lation of any kind to he lp the IRS is smaU. 
Add in the g ridlock now prevailing in Washington, 
and even the IRS acknowlcdg(!S that it does not 
expect Congress to act anytime soon on legislation 
to reverse La11i11R nnd F~id}?ely. 1 "3 
iAAsee john!>On, s1111ra note 'i, at 'i20-'i24 (de.scribing argu-
menh> and cvidenc(• on both !>idl'l> of lhc policy debate). 
H>'9Mac1ara, ~lll'fQ note n (quolmg John Dalrymple, IRS 
Deputy C,>mmi.,..,inm·r for &•rvtCl'!> and Enforcement); >cc't' 11/~ 
Katherine M. I Mlwringtun, "R<.~ulalton or Paid Tax-Reform 
Preparers A forvgunl! (t,nclui.ion Regard!~ or the Result in 
the l.Jn>m.i: c.i~," I Suffolk ti L Rfi• On/111r 105 (2013). 
'""C.i: .• I I R. 4470, la\. Return Pn:parer Accountability Act of 
2014; and H.R. 1570, T.1:1.p.iycr ProtL'Ctinn and Preparer Fraud 
Prevention Act of 20 l'l. 
1
"
1£.g., Joi.eph J lhomd1f..4!, "Stop Blaming the IRS for 
Pn>blems It Didn't Creak," Tur Nolf<', Jul} 14, 2014, p . 115 
(apprupn.:1tcl}' noting th1.· ..,hurtcominbrs or Congres!> in tal( 
h.-gislatilln .1nd uwn.ight, but -..iy in~ that " the IRS deserv~ a 
hard time frt,m Con~rL~.,. In n.--ccnt year.., iii. lii.t of failures and 
tra~r1.-ssioni. b long and ""'r1ou'>. ") 
1 Lx., IRS Ovcr..1ghl lk'.ird. "/\nnual Report to Congl"CS!> 
2013," at 11 -23 (Mnr. 20 14). 
19
'Madarn, ~1111ra null' 13 (ci ting lk•noit) . 
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Another bill might offer a way around that 
obstacle but would raise concerns of its own. If 
enacted, the Tax Refund Protection Act of 2014 
would vest authority to regulate tax return prepar-
ers not in Treasury and the IRS, but in the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an 
independent agency within the Federal Reserve 
System. 194 StyHng the measure as a consumer pro-
tection matter rather than a tax administration 
matter and vesting authority outside the IRS migh t 
facilita te passage. 
But we should think long and hard before expe-
diency drives us in this direction. The CFPB is less 
expert in the area than Treasury and the IRS. It also 
has vast responsibilities under the Dodd-Frank Act, 
which created it, and might pay Jess attention to this 
interloper than to matters within its core responsi-
bilities. Moreover, the CFPB is itself controvers ial. lt 
was designed lo have extraordinary independence 
- far too much, critics allege. The CFPB's broad 
empowerment and its relative independence from 
congression<tl, presidential, and judicial overs ight 
have led to suggt>slions that the CFPB is dangcr-
ous, 1 9~ perhaps unconstitutional.1% 
B. Possible Non-Legislative Federal Actions 
1. Civil and crimina l penalties. Even if Circular 230 
were invalidated in toto (wrud'\ no one suggests is a 
possibility), the government could s till punish (and 
hopefully deter) egregious wrongdoing and incom-
petence by tax advisers and return preparers. An 
imposing array of potentially appl icable civil and 
criminal provis ions exists in the tax code. 
CiviJJy, the code sets forth penalties (of varying 
amounts, with different elements and subject to 
various defenses) for advisers or preparers who (1) 
give unreasonable advice, leading to a tax under-
statement, 1q7 (2) fail to give the taxpayer a copy of 
the rcturn, 19ti (3) fail to sign the rcturn, 199 (4) fail to 
supply an identifying number,200 (5) fail to retain 
copies or a lis t of re turns,2°1 (6) endorse or negotiate 
a check issued to a taxpayer,'~112 (7) fail to comply 
with due diligence regulations concerning the 
'')'H.R. 4463. 
'"
5£.g., Todd :lywicki, "The Consumer Hnancial Protectiun 
13un.>au: Savior or Menace?" 81 Geo. Wuslt. I.. Rl'V. 856(2013); and 
13renden D. Soucy, "The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: 
111c Solution or the Problem?" 4-0 Fle1. SI. U. L Rro. 691 (2013). 
'%Eric Pean.on, " A Brief &say on the Con&titulionality of lhc 
C(msumer Financial Protection Bureau," 47 CreiKllton L. Ri:v. 99 
(2013)-











earned income tax credit,20~ (8) promote abusive tax 
shelters,204 (9) aid and abet the understatement of 
tax liabilities,2ns and (10) improperly disclose tax 
return information.206 Moreover, violation of some 
of these provisions allows the government to seek 
an injunction against the adviser or prepare r pro-
hibiting future conduct, including return prcpara-
tion.207 
CriminaUy; tax advisers and return preparers can 
be incarcerated wider the tax code for (1) altcmpt-
ing to evade or defeat the assessment or colleclion 
of a tax,208 (2) aiding and assisting in the understate-
ment of tax Hability,209 (3) delivering to the IRS a 
false return or olher documcnt,210 (4) interfering 
with tax administration,211 and (5) unauthorized 
use or disclosure of tax return information.212 These 
prohibitions are reinforced by criminal statutes in 
other titles of the U.S. Code, including prohibitions 
on lying lo federal officials,:u., conspiracy,214 a iding 
and abetting violation of the law,m and mail and 
wire fraud .21" 
The Lo11ing and Ridgely courts adverted to those 
sections in giving Circular 230 a restricted scope. 
They concluded that Congress could not have in· 
tended 31 U.S.C. section 330(a) to be read so broadly 
that it would render superfluous this imposing 
array of targeted sanctions211 or allow the lRS to 
circumvent procedural sa feguards written into 
them by basing sanctions ins tead on Circular 230.21a 
Should future litigation invalidate vulnerable 
portions of Circular 230, the I RS would still have the 
above civil and criminal sanctions with which to 
punish, and by which to dNer, fraudul.ent or incom-
petent behavior by tax advisers and preparers. 
Many arrows would remain in the government's 
quiver. One must acknowledge I.he practical rea lity 
that Circular 230 remedies might in some instances 
203section 6695(g). 
» 1Section 67tX>. 
~lion 6701. 
ZOOSect:ion 6713. 
207Sectiorn .. 7407 and 7408. 





:mSections 721~(a)(3) and 7216. 
213 18 U.S.C. ~>ction HJ01. 
21418 U.S.C. !:>e<'.tion 371. 
21
-;18 U.S.C. sectio ns 286 and 287. 
2 1618 U.S.C. sections 1341 and 1343. For discussion of lhl! tax 
and related criminal statutes, see John A. Townsend et al., 111x 
Crimes, chs. 2A, 213. and 3 (2008); and Scott A. Schumacher, 
"Magnifying Detern:nce by ProM?<uting Professionals," 8') Intl. 
L.J. 511 (2014). 
2171..ouiTlg, 742 F.2d a t 1020; Ridgcl.11, 20 14 U.S. DbL LEXIS 
96447, at •17-· 1s. 
118Lot1i11g, 917 P. Supp.2d al 72-79. 
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be faster or easier to apply than alternative targeted 
remedies under the civiJ and criminal sections de-
scribed above. There could be an efficiency loss. But 
after all, Congress wrote procedural safeguards into 
civil and criminal penalties for a reason. Procedural 
protections should not be brushed aside lightly just 
to make the lRS's job easier.2 1<.1 
2. 31 U.S.C. section 330(d). Our focus thus far has 
been on subsection (a) of 31 U.S.C. section 330. It 
now is time to bring subsection (d) into the discus-
sion. Congress added subsection (d) in 1984 as part 
of the tax shelter wars. Subsection (d) provides: 
"Nothing in this section or in any other provision of 
law shall be construed to limit the authority 
of ... the Treasury to impose standards applicable 
to the rendering of written advice with respect to 
any entity, transaction plan or arrangement, or 
other plan or a.rrangement, which is of a type which 
rTreasury] determines as having a potential for tax 
avoidance or evasion." 
If courts continue to limit 31 U.S.C. section 
330(a), the IRS wouJd be strongly tempted to 
ground CircuJar 230 rules, as much as possible, in 
31 U.S.C. section 330(d) as an alternative delegation 
of rulcmaking power. Doing so would ra:ise three 
concerns, however. 
First, 31 U.S.C. section 330(d) isn't a dcm, affir-
mative conferral of power. It does not say that 
Treasury has lhe power. It says only that no law 
prevents it from having the power. But where is the 
positive delegation from Congress to the agency? I 
suspect the courts wouJd get past this objection, 
though. The oddly worded section probably wouJd 
be seen as a delegation by negative inference.220 
Otherwise, what is the provision for? The courts 
presume that Congress means its enactments to 
have effect, and interpretations that create sta tutory 
nullities usually are avoided.221 
21~Statutory procedural protections are not the only barrier 
to effective enforcement; bureaucratic failure. play a role as 
well A rcct.'nt study found that the IRS often (almost half the 
time) fails to timely process complaints it receives about return 
preparers. ·1 roasury lnspector General for Tax Administration, 
"Proc~ Do Not Ensure That Complaintl> Against Tax Return 
Prepart!rS Are '!imely, Accurately, and Consistently Processed,'' 
No. 2014-40--056 (Aug. 8, 2014). 
220Probably but not certainly. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of 
lite United 8t11tes ti. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 160 (4th C ir. 2013) ("we 
do not presume a delegation of power [to ru1 agency) simply 
from the absence of an express withholding of power"); and 
National Rifle Ass'n of America Jue. v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 136 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000). Cf Wowiak v. Dolgencorp LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
113437, at •7 (M.O. Fla. 2009) (a plaintiff "may not establish 
federal {court! jurisdiction through negative inferenCL>S"). 
:m £.g., B11bbitl v. Sweet Home Chapter of Com1111111ities for a Great 
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697-698 (1995); and Johnson, "The 'No 
Surplusage· Canon in State ;md Local Tax Ca~s," State Tn:r 
Note:;, ~pt. 17, 2012, p. 793. 
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Second, 31 U.S.C. section 330(d) cou ld not sup-
port a ll of the vulnerable Circular 230 ruJes. By its 
terms, 31 U.S.C. section 330(d) allows regulation of 
wdtten advice onJy. Oral adv.ice or other conduct 
would not be covered. 
Third, some courts would feel w1easy about 
aggressive application of 31 U.S.C. section 330(d). 
The language having to do with "any plan or 
arrangement Treasury thinks has a potential for tax 
avoidance" is vague and potentially sweeping. Ob-
viously, Congress was trying to get at tax shelters, 
but neither thjs nor other statutes have been notably 
successful in defining them.222 
Tax avoidance usually is w1derstood as reducing 
one's tax liability by legal means. Buying a house 
rather than renting, buying tax-exempt state or local 
bonds, and forming a business as a Jlmited liability 
comp<rny or S corporation rather than a C corpora-
tion aU are transactions with potential for tax avoid-
ance. Could Congress really have meant 31 U.S.C. 
section 330(d) to sweep so broadly? 
Hesitation regarding that question would inspire 
some courts to disfavor an aggressive Treasury 
interpretation of 31 U.S.C. section 330(d). l.ndeed, 
that happened in Ridgely. The government asserted 
31 U.S.C. section 330(d) late, raising it for the first 
time in oral argument, and the court was disin-
clined to read the provision broadly. Finding that 
the text, context, and history of 31 U.S.C. section 330 
paint a clear picture, the court remarked: "That 
clarity cannot be edipsed by brief, thinly supported 
references to ambiguow,; statutory language [in 31 
U.S.C. section 330(d)J, the relevance of which the 
IRS never really explains. "22.'I 
Continued restrictive interpretation of 31 U.S.C. 
section 330(a) would give the government an incen-
tive to do a better job of explanation in future cases. 
For the reasons discussed above, 31 U.S.C. section 
330(d) couJd not completely substitute for a broad 
view of 31 U.S.C. section 330(a), but it would be part 
of the package of government responses. 
3. 31 U.S.C. section 330(b). Could the government 
in future cases make more substantial use of an-
other portion of the statute: subsection (b)? In 
relevant part, 31 U.S.C. section 330(b) provides that 
the IRS "may suspend or disbar from practice ... or 
censure, a representative who ... is incompe-
tent; ... is disreputable; ... violates regulations pre~ 
scribed under Lsection 33U]; or ... with intent to 
defraud, willfully and k.nowir1gly misleads or 
threatens the person being represented." 
We will need a great deal more judicial guidance 
before we can fmm a clear idea of the extent to 
222£.g., ::.ections 6707A(c) and 6662(d)(2)(c)(ii). 
22.1Ridgely, 2014 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1..16447, at "22. 
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which subsection (b) can occupy ground from 
which Loving and Ridgely ousted subsection (a). One 
question, of course, is whether practice and repre-
sentative have the same meaning in the two sub-
sections, rendering (b) as limited as (a). The 
consistent meaning canon of construction would, if 
applied, push a court toward the same meaning in 
both places.224 However, that canon is ignored or 
decuned about as often as it is applied.225 
Moreover, the component "violates regulations 
prescribed under [section 330]" presumably does 
not give Treasury carte blanche to promulgate any 
regulations it wishes and thus bootstrap itself into 
an opportunity, previously unavailable, to sanction 
practitioners. Violation of a regulation that is pro-
cedurally or substantially invalid should not rea-
sonably provide the predicate for imposition of 
Circular 230 sanctions.226 
4. 'Voluntary' initiatives. As seen in Section IIT.C.l, 
as a stopgap pending legislative change, the IRS 
created an ostensibly voluntary program to achieve 
as fully as possible what the mandatory program 
invalidated in Loving would have done. The ''vol-
untary" program survived its first chaUenge when 
the district court decided AICPA. Will it avoid or 
survive other challenges as well? If so, one would 
expect the government to consider similar more or 
less voltmtary expedients, whenever possible, 
should other parts of Circular 230 be invalidated. 
C. Possible Nonfederal Responses 
1. State regulation. Extensive bodies of law already 
exist in the states on the professional responsibili-
ties of lawyers, CPAs, and some other profession-
als.227 No one thinks that state regulation and 
professional self-policing are complete answers to 
the problems, but some states may prove more 
aggressive in regulation than others. For example, 
four states regulate return preparers in ways that 
would take up some of the slack created by Lov-
ing.22s 
224See, e.g., Atlantic Cleaners {:t Dryers Inc. v. United Stales, 286 
U.S. 427, 433 (1932). 
2z.~see generally Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading 
Lnw: Tile Interpretation of Legal Texts 170-173 (2012). 
226For discussion of the ways in whid1 Treasury tax regula-
tions may be challenged, see Johnson, "Preserving Fairness in 
Tax Administration in the Mayo Era," 32 Va. Tax /Zev. 269, 300-323 
(2012)-
2,2 The state rules often are heavily influenced by ethical 
pronmuicements by professional organizations. See, e.g., ABA 
Formal Op. 85-352 Uuly 7, 1985); and "Report of the Special Task 
Force on Formal Opinion 85-352," 39 Tax Law. 635 (1985). 
228Set Cal. Code Ann. section 22250; Md. Code Ann. section 
10-824; N.Y. CLS Tax section 32; and Or. Rev. Stat. section 
673.457. 
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2. Malpractice suits. Taxpayers given bad advice or 
otherwise abused by their tax advisers and prepar-
ers often can sue in state or federal court on a 
variety of theories. Again, this cannot be a complete 
remedy. Many taxpayer-clients lack the resources to 
successfully prosecute malpractice suits, and a 
tangle of legal doctrines often renders those suits 
unsuccessful.229 Nonetheless, this private remedy is 
part of the mix. Malpractice suits are now fairly 
common in failed high-end tax shelters and have 
had at least some impact in curbing bad practices.23° 
VI. Conclusion 
We may be at the start of a sea change in 
professional responsibility in tax. For decades, Trea-
sury has been increasingly aggressive in regulating 
tax practice through Circular 230. Recent cases 
suggest that Treasury's zeal sometimes outstrips its 
statutory authority. 
If the approach of recent cases is confirmed by 
future litigation and Congress chooses not to act, 
significant portions of Circular 230 may be at risk of 
invalidation.231 The fine art of rendering sound tax 
advice - always difficult232 - may for a time 
become even harder as once-accepted norms be-
come unsettled. 
The sky, of course, is not falling and will not fall. 
Organisms and systems often display impressive 
capacity to adapt to changed conditions. Moreover, 
there are features of our federal tax system that 
even with the loss of important parts of Circular 230 
would prevent the degeneration of tax practice into 
an anything goes Wild West free-for-all. We will 
survive in any case, but the ways in which tax law 
is practiced in the United States may have to find a 
new equilibrium. · 
229n1cre is another possible concern. For many causes of 
malpractice action, the plaintiff must identify a standard of care 
or duty and then show that the adviser's conduct fe ll below that 
standard. The Circular 230 rules ace a convenient source for 
those standards. If important Circular 230 rules are invalidated 
by the courts, plaintiffs in malpractice cases may find it more 
difficult to establish that their advisers' conduct fell below a 
reco~ized level of care or duty. 
2 See, e.g., Jay A. Soled, "Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and 
Their Implications for Tax Compliance," 58 A111. U. L. Rev. 267, 
268-269 (2008). 
2311 am not alone in harboring this suspicion. "The outcomes 
of Loving and Ridgely will spawn additional cases challenging 
other sections of Treasury Circular 230 and possibly, or perhaps 
probably, limiting some of the ethical rules of practice applicable 
to even attorneys, CPAs, and enroJJ.ed agents." Internal Revenue 
Service Advisory Council, 2014 Pub. Rep. 23 (Nov. 19, 2014). 
:z.12See, e.g., Charles A. Rose, "The Tax Lawyer's Dilemma: 
Recent Developments Heighten Tax Lawyer Rt.>sponsibilities 
and Liabilities," 2011 Co//1111. Bus. L. Rev. 258, 259. 
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